

Yugoslavia
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Directorate
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Intelligence Memorandum
Office of European Analysis
27 January 1993

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Greater Serbia: A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s

Summary

Belgrade's determination to forge an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia"-even at a high cost to Serbs and their opponents-is ironclad, according to a methodologically-based interagency analysis. The conciliatory attitude of Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs during recent negotiations in Geneva is, we believe, a tactical maneuver to buy time. Belgrade is not likely to stop providing active support for the creation of an ethnically pure greater Serbia by force unless the international community:

- strictly enforces trade sanctions
- arms Bosnia and Croatia
- conducts air strikes against Serb military targets in Bosnia
- enforces a no-fly zone in the FRY and

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This memorandum, based on a "Factions" political analysis of Serbia, was prepared by [redacted] Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, West European Division, EURA, on [redacted]

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TO:

FROM:

Mr. George J. Tenet
Intelligence Coordinator
NSC/OEOB

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
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threatens, and perhaps carries out, air strikes against military targets in Serbia. ☐

Combining the knowledge of CIA, State Department, DIA, and the Department of Defense specialists on Serbia with a well tested policy forecasting model, we conclude that without massive international intervention, the probability is high that a hostile "Greater Serbia" will be a disruptive force in Europe through mid-decade. Once Belgrade consolidates power and territory we expect it will foment conflicts among its neighbors; use low-level force outside its borders; initiate the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo; acquire non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction; and possibly expand into non-Serbian parts of Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Croatian coast.

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The plight of Kosovar Albanians probably will deteriorate within the next year, according to the study. The political balance of power in Serbia is shifting in favor of groups that want to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. Our analysis found that Milosevic and Serbian nationalists-with the tacit support of the military-drive Serbia's expansion and its ethnic policies. Because the military and Serbian nationalists share many of Milosevic's policy goals, Serbian expansionist and ethnic policies are likely to remain unchanged even if he were to leave office. The West's ability to shape Serbian behavior will be limited unless pressure is put directly on the nationalists and the military. ☐


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Discussion

Using the "FACTIONS" political analysis and forecasting method to guide its efforts, an interagency working group met recently to assess four questions stemming from Serb nationalists' efforts to forge a "Greater Serbia." The issues examined were:

- || At what level of pain imposed by the international community would Serbia stop providing active support for the creation by force of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia"? ||
- || What role would a hypothetical "Greater Serbia" play in Balkan politics? ||
- What degree of self-rule/ethnic rights will Belgrade permit Kosovar Albanians?
- How bad would conditions in Serbia have to get before the political balance of power in Belgrade favored the ouster of Milosevic?

The "FACTIONS" methodology forced the analysts to focus on policy options associated with each of the four issues, identify the groups and leaders who will try to influence each policy decision (see box 1), estimate the relative political clout of those players, identify the policy outcome each player prefers, and estimate the importance of the issue relative to other items on the player's agenda. The "FACTIONS" method quantifies this information and employs a mathematical model of group decisionmaking to forecast the policy outcome. "FACTIONS," which has an impressive track record during its 10 years of use at CIA, also can be used to estimate the effects of events such as a change in leadership or the decision of a foreign government to intervene politically.


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Box 1

Leaders and Groups Identified as Players on Foreign Policy and
Ethnic Rights Issues in Serbia

Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia
Dobrica Cosic, President of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
Milan Panic, Prime Minister of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, and Serbian Paramilitary Forces
Army High Command
Mid-level officers
Army Conscripts
Draft-age youth
Serbian Police
Democratic opposition parties
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)
Serbian Orthodox Church
Independent media, especially newspapers
State-controlled media
Bosnian Serbs
Croatian Serbs
Kosovo Serbs
Pro-Serb Montenegrins
Non-pro-Serb Montenegrins
Hardline Kosovar Albanians
Ibrahim Rugova/Moderate Kosovar Albanians
Kosovar Albanian masses
Hardline Macedonian Albanians
Moderate Macedonian Albanians
Macedonian nationalists
Sandzak Muslims
Workers
Economic Managers
Serbian Mafia
Belgrade Students
Albania/President Sali Berisha
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Croatia
European Community (EC)

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
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Greece
Macedonian government
Montenegro
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
Russia
Turkey
UN Security Council (UNSC)
UN Mediators Cyrus Vance and David Owen
US Congress
US Administration

In the following sections we explore in detail Serbia's likely course of action on the ethnic and foreign policy questions under examination. In some cases, the FACTIONS analysis projected more violent results than did traditional DI analysis (see box 2). The working group's assessment of the clout wielded by hardline Serbs heavily conditioned the projected policy outcomes in the four areas.¹ For example, hardline Serb groups wishing to reduce the rights of Kosovar Albanians--including those wishing to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians--are almost twice as powerful as groups that want to protect or expand the rights of Kosovar Albanians (see figure 1). These Serb groups have even more clout on foreign policy issues. In addition, only on the issue of the rights of Kosovar Albanians were Western nations and international organizations considered to be players. Even so, the combined clout of the US, the UN, the EC, CSCE, and Russia on the "Albanian rights" issue was estimated at less than 30 percent of that of Milosevic and the FRY army.

For each issue we have provided a diagram that depicts the range of possible policy outcomes. These options, including the status quo policy in force in late January 1993, are spaced in such a way as to capture the "political distance" between them in the Serbian context. In the diagrams, policy options are placed below the line. The policy each player would choose--not settle for--is indicated above the line. For each political decision under analysis, FACTIONS predicts a policy outcome (identified as the "Forecast") based on experts' assessments of the players' policy goals, relative strength, and degree of interest in the issue.

¹There was general agreement among the working group members about who the players were, their relative political clout, and the policies each player preferred for each issue. When disagreements occurred, they were noted, and alternative scenarios were devised.

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Box 2

Traditional DI Analytic Views of
Issues Addressed by Factions

The strong showing by followers of ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj in the December elections and recent reporting moved the conclusions of traditional DI analyses much closer to conclusions of the FACTIONS exercise.

-- Serb acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia is a tactical maneuver to stave off outside military intervention and to make the Bosnians appear uncooperative. Serb nationalists and the Belgrade government have not quit the road to a "Greater Serbia"; they have only made a tactical detour in Bosnia.

-- The radicals will definitely make Serbia a disruptive force in the Balkans for the foreseeable future.

-- Efforts by Serbian President Milosevic and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to keep the lid on there will be hampered by increased ultranationalist activity in Kosovo and Macedonia.

On several points, however, DI analysts believe that elasticity in the Serbian political system allows the possibility of less violent results than FACTIONS forecasts:

-- Fearing military intervention, Milosevic may suspend active support for Serbs in Bosnia before Serbia proper became the target of airstrikes. Any such suspension, however, would be temporary and only in effect while pressure was applied.

-- Both Belgrade and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are unprepared for a major confrontation and are still willing to avoid major bloodletting. The presence of ultranationalists in Kosovo, however, and increased international activity in the Balkans--by giving encouragement to the Albanians-- probably will lead to conflict eventually.

-- In addition, although partition of Kosovo is possible, it is unlikely until fighting has occurred and both sides see such an outcome as in their interest.



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Figure 1

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Clout of Players on Policy toward Kosovar Albanians



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A Greater Serbia at Any Price?

The interagency group concluded that Serbia's democratic parties and its independent media have little influence in Belgrade despite their vocal opposition. Milosevic, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Serb nationalists in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo-with the tacit support of the military-drive the Serbian government's active support for the creation of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia." They appear willing to endure great pain before they abandon this policy. Indeed, the "FACTIONS" methodology indicates that before Belgrade even temporarily retreats from actively supporting the creation of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia," (see figure 2) the international community will have to:

- enforce economic sanctions vigorously
- isolate Serbia politically
- create protected safe zones in Bosnia for Bosnians
- restrict the arms embargo to the FRY
- pull UNPROFOR out
- arm Bosnia and Croatia
- initiate air strikes against military targets in Bosnia
- enforce a no-fly zone in the FRY
- and perhaps threaten and undertake airstrikes against military targets in Serbia.

A Hostile "Greater Serbia"

To assess the role of a "Greater Serbia" in Balkan politics, the working group considered the foreign policy goals of players likely to shape Belgrade's relations with its neighbors in the mid 1990s. Our analysis suggests that a "Greater Serbia" is likely to be a continual source of trouble in the Balkans well into this decade. The interagency FACTIONS exercise concludes that a "Greater Serbia" will eschew the Danish model of a peaceful, cooperative, CSCE-abiding state and opt to follow Iraq's hostile, expansionist example instead. "Greater Serbia" probably will stir up trouble among its neighbors, begin the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and acquire weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and delivery systems. Our analysis also indicates that a "Greater Serbia" would not hesitate to use low-level force outside its borders and could possibly try to dominate the government of Macedonia and take land not occupied by Serbs in Bosnia or Croatia, particularly near the Adriatic coast (see figure 3).



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Figure 2

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WHAT WOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE TO DO TO STOP THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT FROM PROVIDING ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR CREATION OF AN ETHNICALLY PURE GREATER SERBIA BY FORCE?




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Figure 3

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WHAT ACTIONS WOULD TYPIFY THE REGIONAL ROLE PLAYED BY A "GREATER SERBIA"



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Albanian "Reservations" in Kosovo

According to our analysis, the political balance of power in Belgrade has shifted to groups that favor herding the Albanians—who comprise 90 percent of Kosovo's population—into less desirable parts of Kosovo that can be administratively separated from areas reserved for Serbs (see figure 4). Although both Kosovar Serbs and Albanians now want to avoid violence, a concerted Serb effort to create a Belgrade-dominated, impoverished Albanian rump state probably would generate a violent Kosovar Albanian reaction. Violence could also be sparked by Albanian radicals. This action would play into the hands of Serb extremists—such as Vojislav Seselj, head of the Serbian Radical Party, and his followers—who want to pursue an even more radical ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. ☐

Milosevic Is Only Part of the Problem

Economic and political conditions in Serbia would have to deteriorate well beyond their current levels before Milosevic's supporters would turn against him and drive him out of office, according to the "FACTIONS" analysis. The working group estimates that the nationalists, the military, and the police will support Milosevic despite an effective embargo, labor unrest, and severe hyper-inflation. Only if all those things occur and Serbs suffer significant territorial losses in Croatia and Bosnia, we conclude, would the nationalists and military bring down the Milosevic government (see figure 5). ☐

Even if Milosevic were to leave the scene, however, military and nationalist groups would still be the dominant players in Belgrade. A "Greater Serbia" without Milosevic would foment trouble among its neighbors and probably take, or threaten to take, some non-Serb territory in Croatia, Bosnia, or Macedonia. Similarly, the "FACTIONS" model indicates that Serbia without Milosevic would be as determined to support the creation of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia" by force as would a Milosevic-led Serbia. Kosovar Albanians, however, might be spared expulsion or ethnic cleansing if Milosevic's replacement were much weaker than he. ☐



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Figure 4

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WHAT DEGREE OF SELF RULE/ETHNIC RIGHTS WILL SERBIA PERMIT ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO?


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Figure 5

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AT WHAT POINT WILL GROUPS IN SERBIA MOVE TO FORCE MILOSEVIC OUT?



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